The Palestinian story: belonging, loss and the hope for freedom

Before the conflict: lives, culture and belonging

Palestinian history does not begin with displacement or struggle. It includes families, towns and villages, work and farming, education, art and community. The Palestinian Museum’s digital archive collects photographs, letters, diaries and other records of those lives.¹

Palestinian embroidery passes skills and identity between generations; UNESCO inscribed it as intangible cultural heritage in 2021.² Shared culture coexists with Muslim, Christian, secular and other experiences. For many families, attachment means a particular home, landscape and family memory, not simply a position on a map.

How a national identity developed

National identities do not appear in a single day. Local, Arab and Palestinian identities developed during late Ottoman rule and the Mandate, alongside newspapers and political organisations. Local attachment preceded independent statehood; the absence of an earlier Palestinian state does not negate a people or its rights.³

Many Jews understood Zionism as return and security; many Palestinian Arabs feared losing control over their future in the land where they lived. Understanding both perspectives helps explain conflict without justifying everything done in their names.

Millions of neighbours, not a uniform population

PCBS estimated 3.43 million Palestinians in the West Bank and 2.13 million in Gaza at the end of 2025: about 5.56 million combined. These are dated Palestinian statistical estimates, not a live count or the worldwide Palestinian population.⁴

The West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, Palestinian citizens of Israel and diaspora communities have different legal statuses and living conditions. Population figures do not establish agreement on a political solution. Behind them are people whose lives and rights a settlement must address.

1947: partition accepted by one leadership, rejected by another

UN General Assembly Resolution 181, adopted on 29 November 1947, recommended Jewish and Arab states and a special international regime for Jerusalem.⁵ Jewish leadership accepted it; Palestinian Arab leadership and Arab states rejected it as an unjust division of an Arab-majority country.⁶

The resolution dates to 1947, not 1948. It proposed two states without establishing them. Describing leadership decisions does not mean every Arab individual was consulted or personally voted.

1948: war, independence and the Nakba

Fighting between the communities followed partition. After Israel declared independence in May 1948, Arab state armies entered the war. No proposed Arab state emerged: the West Bank came under Jordanian control and Gaza under Egyptian administration.⁶

For Palestinians, the Nakba—Arabic for catastrophe—means wartime displacement and dispossession.⁷ More than 700,000 Palestinians became refugees; departures involved flight from fear and fighting as well as expulsions, with circumstances differing by locality.⁸⁷ No single explanation covers every case.

Rejecting partition is important context, but it does not erase civilian suffering or settle refugee rights. Recognising the Nakba need not deny Israeli independence. It means seeing those who lost homes as others established a state.

1967: escalation, war and occupation

Before the Six-Day War, Egypt massed forces in Sinai, demanded the UN force’s withdrawal and announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel perceived grave danger.⁹ On 5 June, Israel launched a pre-emptive air attack on Egypt; the war expanded to Jordan and Syria.¹⁰

Israel captured the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights.⁹ For many Palestinians, 1967 brought further displacement and Israeli military rule. Security context does not erase the consequences of controlling another population. Initiating military attack and responsibility for the wider escalation are distinct questions.

1987–1993: the First Intifada

The First Intifada began in December 1987. A broad uprising against occupation, it involved strikes, boycotts, community organisation and civil disobedience, as well as stone-throwing and violence. “Intifada” does not describe a single method.¹¹

Military rule and the absence of political prospects help explain protest; individual acts still require separate judgement. Demonstrations and strikes are not terrorist attacks; stones can also kill. National struggle does not permit harming people, and authorities remain responsible for how they use force.

1993: mutual recognition and an unfinished horizon

In September 1993, the PLO recognised Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and renounced terrorism and violence; Israel recognised the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people. This was not Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state.¹² Oslo created an interim framework without resolving final-status issues.

Arab rejection in 1947 does not describe every subsequent Palestinian position. There was also a political choice for recognition and negotiation. Failures and broken trust do not erase what can be learned from those steps.

From 2000: the Second Intifada and deeper fear

The Second Intifada erupted in September 2000. It included demonstrations, clashes and armed operations. Palestinian suicide bombings murdered Israeli civilians; Israeli military operations also killed Palestinian civilians. Violence and loss of life deepened fear and mistrust.¹³

The whole period cannot be called nonviolent protest, nor every participant a terrorist. Many Palestinians understood an uprising against occupation and political despair; many Israelis remember fear on buses, in restaurants and on streets. Understanding an experience does not justify murder.

2005–2007: disengagement, division and blockade

In 2005, Israel evacuated settlements and its permanent military presence inside Gaza under disengagement.¹⁴ Hamas seized control of Gaza by force in 2007, deepening the split with the Palestinian Authority. Israel greatly tightened movement and access restrictions, citing security concerns, with severe consequences for livelihoods and daily life.¹⁵

Gaza’s circumstances differ from the West Bank’s. They require examining control over crossings, Hamas’s responsibility and civilian suffering alongside Israeli security needs. Civilians are not identical to their rulers, and retain their rights regardless of those rulers’ actions.

From 7 October 2023 to the present

On 7 October 2023, the terrorist organisation Hamas led a brutal terrorist attack in Israel with other armed groups, involving deliberate murder of civilians and hostage-taking.¹⁶ These acts are not legitimate national protest. The ensuing war brought extensive killing and destruction in Gaza and mass displacement. Recognising one community’s catastrophe must not erase another’s.

Humanitarian update from OCHA’s report dated 2 October 2026: Gaza continued to face shelter, water and aid difficulties; the West Bank saw displacement through demolitions, settler violence and disruption to education.¹⁷ This is a dated update, not live reporting. Arrangements are discussed separately on the Gaza ceasefire page.

What lies at the heart of the problem?

The problem is not simply hatred or unfamiliarity. It concerns sovereignty, territorial control, movement, security, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, resources and accountable leadership. OCHA documents how West Bank restrictions affect access to work, education and health care.¹⁸

In its July 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice found Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful and said it must end as rapidly as possible. This was an advisory opinion, not an individual’s criminal trial.¹⁹ Legal findings, security explanations and personal experiences must be distinguished.

Alongside Israeli control, solutions require accountable Palestinian leadership, protection from armed groups and institutions serving the public. A stable outcome cannot ask Israelis to live in permanent fear or Palestinians to relinquish freedom permanently.