Room for Peace

Israel and the PalestiniansJerusalem, Ramallah and Washington

The Kerry talks

Talks without agreementEnded without agreement

US-mediated permanent-status negotiations that ended without an agreement and without an agreed document.

In one sentence

To reach a permanent agreement within nine months, or at least an agreed framework for going on.

Mahmoud Abbas seated with John Kerry before a meeting in Paris, February 2014
Mahmoud Abbas seated with John Kerry before a meeting in Paris, February 2014 State Department photo / Public Domain

In 30 seconds

In July 2013 US Secretary of State John Kerry brought Israel and the Palestinians back to the table. For nine months the teams talked, and Kerry's team drafted a framework paper.⁠1 In April 2014 the talks collapsed, and each side blames the other.

Where it stands today

The talks were suspended on 24 April 2014, days before their target date, without an agreement.⁠1 They were the last round of direct permanent-status negotiations; as of October 2026 none are under way, according to Security Council Report.⁠2

Status checked on

The challenge

Since the Olmert–Abbas talks of 2008 there had been no sustained negotiation on permanent status. The new round was given nine months, until 29 April 2014.⁠1

A deal made the talks possible: Israel would release 104 long-serving Palestinian prisoners in 4 rounds, and the Palestinians would meanwhile hold back from moves at the UN.⁠1

The road there

  1. Talks open, mediated by Kerry.⁠1
  2. Israel does not carry out the fourth prisoner release on time.⁠1
  3. The Palestinians sign requests to join 15 international conventions and bodies.⁠3
  4. Mahmoud Abbas announces a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas.⁠1
  5. Israel suspends the talks.⁠1
  6. In a farewell speech Kerry sets out six principles for a permanent agreement.⁠4

The people

What was discussed

  1. A nine-month timetable for the core issues.⁠1
  2. The release of 104 long-serving prisoners in 4 rounds, in return for the Palestinians not turning to UN bodies.⁠1
  3. An American framework: Kerry's team drafted a paper showing where each side's compromise might lie, which leaders could accept with reservations. According to Herzog, on territory it followed Obama's 2011 positions, it effectively took the right of return off the table, it spoke of mutual recognition of two nation-states, and it left Jerusalem open.⁠3 The sides did not adopt it.⁠1

The geography

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Schematic map of Israel and its neighbours with line typesWest BankGaza StripJerusalemTel AvivGazaRamallahAmmanRafahNaharayim / Baqura
How to use the map

Choose a country on the map or in the list. One finger scrolls the page; two fingers move and pinch the map. You can also use + and −. For one-finger map dragging, enable the button above. Keyboard: arrows to pan, + and − to zoom, Home to reset.

Layers

Classification follows the original research as of 7 Oct 2026. This schematic map is not a legal boundary map or a live update.

  • International boundary agreed in a peace treaty
  • Treaty line with Jordan, “without prejudice to the status” of the territory beyond it
  • 1949 armistice line (“Green Line”) — not an agreed final border
  • “Blue Line” — UN line of withdrawal (2000), not a border
  • Ceasefire / disengagement line with Syria (1974)
  • Other international boundary
  • West Bank and Gaza Strip: permanent status not agreed
  • Golan Heights: held by Israel since 1967; annexation not recognised by the UN
  • UN area of separation (UNDOF); Israeli army positions inside it since December 2024

Schematic map. Lines are approximate and are not a legal determination. Data: Natural Earth (public domain), 1:10m scale; line classification and place names by this site. Lines as of October 2026. Peace map

The hard decisions

  • According to Peace Now figures, during the talks Israel advanced plans and tenders for at least 13,850 housing units in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.⁠1
  • Security stayed contested, especially how long Israeli forces would remain along the Jordan River.⁠3

Where accounts differ

According to The Israeli government and its negotiators
The talks collapsed because of unilateral Palestinian steps: joining the conventions and the reconciliation deal with Hamas, which Israel saw as siding with terrorism.⁠1 Michael Herzog of the Israeli team adds that Abbas disengaged after rejecting the framework in February, and at the White House in March asked for time and never replied.⁠3
According to The Palestinian leadership
The talks collapsed because settlement building went on throughout them, and because Israel did not carry out the fourth prisoner release.⁠1 According to The Christian Science Monitor, in March 2014 Abbas rejected three principles in the US framework: recognising Israel as a Jewish state, giving up the right of return, and declaring an end to the conflict.⁠1
According to The American mediators
Kerry told the Senate on 8 April 2014 that both sides took negative steps. He pointed to the delayed prisoner release and the announcement of 700 housing units in Jerusalem as the moment it all fell apart, and called the Palestinian applications to the conventions unhelpful.⁠5 The envoy Martin Indyk said neither side felt the urgency to make painful compromises, and that in his view the settlement announcements were meant to sabotage the talks;⁠6 according to a Washington Institute summary, he also said Abbas was not willing to respond to the American ideas in March.⁠7

What was carried out 1

  • Three of the four releases went ahead, freeing at least 78 prisoners; the Palestinians held back from UN moves until March 2014.⁠1

What was not 1

  • The fourth release did not happen, the Palestinian Authority joined 15 international conventions, and neither an agreement nor an agreed framework was reached.⁠1

What remains open

  • The lesson: even with a determined mediator, talks are fragile to what each side does outside the room, from settlement building to turning to international bodies to internal Palestinian deals.⁠1
  • How close they came: according to Herzog, Netanyahu moved slowly but by the end had reached, as the US envoy Martin Indyk put it, the zone where an agreement was possible.⁠3 According to Indyk, both sides showed flexibility.⁠6
  • What came next: in December 2016 Kerry set out six principles: borders based on 1967 with equal swaps; two states for two peoples, with mutual recognition; a just and agreed solution for the refugees; Jerusalem as the capital of both states; security for Israel and a demilitarised Palestinian state; and an end to the conflict and all claims. According to the INSS researchers, Israel's government opposed the speech, and Palestinian reactions were mixed.⁠4

Photos, videos and quotes

To watch 1

Kerry's speech on Middle East peace

Event date: · U.S. Department of State

Kerry led the 2013⁠–⁠14 negotiations and used the speech to sum up what he had learned.

Photographs

Local photographs with credits and links to sources and licences. Where a usable image was unavailable, an archive link remains.

Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat with John Kerry at the State Department at the start of the 2013 talks

Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat with John Kerry at the State Department at the start of the 2013 talks

Credit and licence

State Department photo / Public Domain

United States government work; caption: [State Department photo/ Public Domain]

See the photo in the archive

Sources

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Cited on this page

  1. How Secretary Kerry's bid for peace ended up in tattersPress The Christian Science Monitor29 April 2014
  2. The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question — October 2026 Monthly ForecastResearch Security Council Report1 October 2026
  3. Michael Herzog, Inside the Black Box of Israeli-Palestinian TalksResearch Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) / The American Interest27 February 2017
  4. Udi Dekel and Oded Eran, Secretary of State Kerry's Speech on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (INSS Insight No. 885)Research Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)2 January 2017
  5. Report on Secretary Kerry's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 April 2014Press Arutz Sheva (Israel National News)8 April 2014
  6. Indyk: Talks collapsed because sides lacked ‘urgency’Press J. The Jewish News of Northern California (JTA report)16 May 2014
  7. Robert Satloff, PolicyWatch analysis of Martin Indyk's remarks of 8 May 2014Research The Washington Institute for Near East Policy12 May 2014