Room for Peace

Israel and the PalestiniansCamp David, Maryland, United States

The Camp David Summit, 2000

Talks without agreementEnded without agreement

A summit negotiation on permanent status. It ended without an agreement: nothing of substance was signed, and there is no agreed text of the ideas raised there.

In one sentence

To settle every core issue between Israel and the Palestinians at a single summit.

In 30 seconds

Two weeks in July 2000. Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat sat at Camp David with President Bill Clinton and tried to end the conflict.⁠1 The closing statement called the talks unprecedented in scope and detail, but the summit ended without an agreement.⁠2 The negotiations went on for another six months.

Where it stands today

The summit ended on 25 July 2000 without an agreement.⁠2 As of October 2026 there are no permanent-status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, according to Security Council Report.⁠3

Status checked on

The challenge

Oslo promised a permanent deal within five years. May 1999 came and went without one, so the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum set a new target: a framework agreement within five months and a full agreement within a year.⁠4

Both leaders arrived under pressure. According to the Chatham House researchers, Barak wanted one decisive summit while his coalition was falling apart. Arafat came on the defensive, feared a trap and thought the summit premature.⁠5

The road there

  1. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum sets target dates for a permanent agreement.⁠4
  2. The summit opens at Camp David.⁠2
  3. The summit ends without an agreement, with a trilateral statement.⁠2
  4. After a visit by Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif, violent clashes break out.⁠1
  5. Clinton presents his parameters to the two sides.⁠6

The people

What was discussed

  1. Everything was on the table: borders, Jerusalem, refugees, security. According to the US Office of the Historian, the gaps remained on borders, Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees.⁠1
  2. Nothing was handed over in writing. According to Robert Malley, who was on the US team, and Hussein Agha, the ideas were put orally, sometimes as American ideas, and stayed conditional.⁠7
  3. The numbers come from testimony. A PLO document of 2001 speaks of Israel annexing about 9% of the West Bank for about 1% of its own land, plus about 10% more on a long lease.⁠89 Malley and Agha describe the American ideas in similar figures.⁠7 Barak's account is below, under the disputes.
  4. In the closing statement both sides promised to keep negotiating on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338, and to avoid unilateral steps and violence.⁠2

The geography

100%
Schematic map of Israel and its neighbours with line typesWest BankGaza StripJerusalemTel AvivGazaRamallahAmmanRafahNaharayim / Baqura
How to use the map

Choose a country on the map or in the list. One finger scrolls the page; two fingers move and pinch the map. You can also use + and −. For one-finger map dragging, enable the button above. Keyboard: arrows to pan, + and − to zoom, Home to reset.

Layers

Classification follows the original research as of 7 Oct 2026. This schematic map is not a legal boundary map or a live update.

  • International boundary agreed in a peace treaty
  • Treaty line with Jordan, “without prejudice to the status” of the territory beyond it
  • 1949 armistice line (“Green Line”) — not an agreed final border
  • “Blue Line” — UN line of withdrawal (2000), not a border
  • Ceasefire / disengagement line with Syria (1974)
  • Other international boundary
  • West Bank and Gaza Strip: permanent status not agreed
  • Golan Heights: held by Israel since 1967; annexation not recognised by the UN
  • UN area of separation (UNDOF); Israeli army positions inside it since December 2024

Schematic map. Lines are approximate and are not a legal determination. Data: Natural Earth (public domain), 1:10m scale; line classification and place names by this site. Lines as of October 2026. Peace map

The hard decisions

  • Jerusalem and the refugees touched the rawest nerve of both peoples.⁠5
  • Each leader feared his home front. Barak's coalition was collapsing. Arafat feared that fierce opposition to a deal on Jerusalem and refugees would force him to crush an uprising by Hamas.⁠5

Where accounts differ

According to Ehud Barak
Arafat turned down far-reaching proposals and made no counter-offer. According to Benny Morris, who interviewed him, the proposal included a state on about 92% of the West Bank and all of Gaza, a capital in East Jerusalem, and sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. In Barak's view Arafat did not intend to reach a deal, and the intifada was planned in advance.⁠10
According to The Palestinian negotiators (PLO document, July 2001)
The offer was not generous and could not make a viable state: about 9% annexed for about 1%, four cantons surrounded by Israel, giving up occupied East Jerusalem, and no serious discussion of the refugees. According to the document, the Palestinians offered one-to-one land swaps, and had already made the historic compromise at Oslo by accepting Israel on 78% of historic Palestine.⁠8
According to President Clinton and his envoy Dennis Ross
The main responsibility lies with Arafat. According to Malley and Agha, Clinton blamed the Palestinian side in public.⁠7 Ross wrote that everyone made tactical mistakes, but that Arafat was passive, rejected ideas again and again and showed no capacity to close a permanent deal.⁠11
According to Robert Malley, a member of the US team, and Hussein Agha
All three parties made mistakes: there was no formal Israeli offer, Barak held back earlier commitments and settlements grew, the United States was not neutral, and Arafat made no detailed counter-proposals. They write that the Palestinians accepted the annexation of some settlements for land, Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish areas of East Jerusalem, and a mechanism for implementing the right of return.⁠7
According to Yossi Beilin, a minister in Barak's government
Barak wanted peace but did not know how to make it, or how to show the other side he meant it. The US team was not properly prepared.⁠12

What was carried out 0

—

What was not 1

  • Neither a framework agreement nor a permanent agreement was reached, and the Sharm el-Sheikh deadlines passed.⁠24

What changed in real life

  • Two months later, on 28 September 2000, violent clashes broke out and grew into the Second Intifada.⁠1 Whether, and how far, the summit's outcome contributed is disputed.

What remains open

  • What the summit achieved: the leaders themselves negotiated on every core issue, Jerusalem and the refugees included.⁠1 According to Malley and Agha, old taboos were broken, and the two sides understood better than ever what ending the conflict would take.⁠7
  • What came next built on it: in December 2000 Clinton presented his parameters, and in January 2001 the sides met at Taba.⁠6 The Chatham House researchers call the parameters a landmark and see further progress at Taba.⁠5
  • Lessons, according to the same researchers: there were no clear “red lines”, and no advance backing from Arab leaders.⁠5
  • There is no agreed record. Almost every account of “what was offered” rests on the testimony of one participant, and is best read that way.

Photos, videos and quotes

To watch 2

Clinton on the Camp David summit

Event date: · clintonlibrary42

The summit ended without an agreement, and the debate over why still goes on.

Clinton, Barak and Arafat at Camp David

Event date: · clintonlibrary42

The summit was the first attempt to tackle every final-status issue, including Jerusalem, borders and refugees.

Sources

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Cited on this page

  1. The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace ProcessOfficial archive U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian
  2. Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp DavidPrimary The White House (Clinton Presidential archive)25 July 2000
  3. The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question — October 2026 Monthly ForecastResearch Security Council Report1 October 2026
  4. Middle East peace process documents, 1998⁠–⁠1999 (Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh memoranda)Primary United Nations, Division for Palestinian Rights (UNISPAL)
  5. Greg Shapland and Yossi Mekelberg, Israeli–Palestinian Peacemaking: The Camp David approach, 2000Research Chatham House24 July 2018
  6. Clinton Parameters (2000)Research Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)
  7. Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy of ErrorsPress The New York Review of Books9 August 2001
  8. Camp David Peace Proposal of July, 2000: Frequently Asked QuestionsReference Palestine Liberation Organization (Ramallah, July 2001), as reproduced by Al-Bushra
  9. B2. PLO, “Camp David Peace Proposal: Frequently Asked Questions,” Ramallah, July 2001Reference Institute for Palestine Studies — Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 31 no. 1 (Autumn 2001), Documents and Source Material2001
  10. Benny Morris, Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)Press The New York Review of Books13 June 2002
  11. Dennis Ross and Gidi Grinstein, reply by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, Camp David: An ExchangePress The New York Review of Books20 September 2001
  12. Taking Stock: Looking at the Past, Searching for the Future (round-table), vol. 8 no. 3Research Palestine-Israel Journal2001

Further reading