Room for Peace

Peace with a neighbour, normalization with a distant state: what is the difference?

Israel has peace treaties with two states that border it and fought it, Egypt and Jordan, and normalization agreements with distant states that never fought it. This page compares them, row by row. The aim is not to decide which agreement is "better". The aim is to understand why some agreements are far harder to reach.

7 min read

Two kinds of agreement

The peace treaty with Egypt (1979) and the peace treaty with Jordan (1994) ended a state of war between neighbouring states. They had to settle questions of land, borders, security and water12.

The Abraham Accords (2020) established relations with states that have no border with Israel and never fought it34. The documents themselves differ from one another: a full treaty with the UAE, a declaration and a joint communiqué with Bahrain, and a three-way declaration with Morocco. With Sudan no bilateral agreement was signed at all4.

The comparison, row by row

DimensionEgypt 1979Jordan 1994Abraham Accords 2020
Earlier warThe treaty ended a state of war between the two states1.The state of belligerency ended with the Washington Declaration, three months before the treaty5.The UAE and Bahrain never fought Israel34.
Shared land borderYes. The treaty made the international boundary the permanent border1.Yes. The border was delimited in an annex to the treaty, with minor adjustments6.None.
Territory that changed handsIsrael withdrew from all of Sinai by April 19827. Taba was handed to Egypt in 1989, after arbitration8.Jordanian sovereignty over Naharayim/Baqura and Zofar/Al-Ghamr, with Israeli use rights for 25 years6; the arrangement ended in 20199.No territory changed hands.
Evacuation of settlements and basesFourteen settlements were evacuated, the largest of them Yamit, which was cleared by force on 23 April 198210.No settlements were evacuated.No settlements were evacuated.
Security arrangementsLimited-force zones on both sides of the border, monitored by a multinational force (MFO)111.Mutual commitments: no force or threats, no hostile alliances, and prevention of terrorism from each side's territory2.General clauses only: preventing hostile activity and cooperating, with no demilitarised zones and no monitoring force1213.
Water and natural resourcesFree passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran1.Sharing of the Yarmouk and Jordan waters, and cooperation to find Jordan another 50 million cubic metres a year2.Energy and water appear only as fields for future cooperation12.
Link to the Palestinian questionAt Camp David a framework for autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza was agreed. It was not implemented14.Israel respects Jordan's special role at the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem; the refugee question was referred to other frameworks2.Israel suspended the declaration of sovereignty in a separate statement15; the treaty itself has only general wording on resolving the conflict12.
The price the leaders paidThe Arab League suspended Egypt16. Sadat was assassinated in 1981; the peace was one of several documented motives17.Twenty-three deputies in Jordan's parliament voted against18.The Palestinian Authority recalled its ambassador from Abu Dhabi19; the opposition in Bahrain objected20; public support in Morocco fell to 13%21.
Parliamentary approvalKnesset: 95 in favour, 18 against22.Knesset: 105 in favour, 3 against23. Jordanian parliament: 55 in favour, 23 against18.Knesset: 80 in favour and 13 against (UAE)24; 62 in favour and 14 against (Bahrain)25.
Incentives from a third partyAccording to a 2015 Congressional Research Service report, the United States has given Egypt 1.3 billion dollars a year in military aid since 1987, and explains it partly as sustaining the treaty26.The United States and Russia signed as witnesses2. Financial incentives were not researched for this page.An F-35 deal for the UAE, which was not completed27; US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara28; Sudan's removal from the terrorism list29.
Ties between peoples, and trade in 2025Described in research as a "cold peace"2130. Trade: 560.5 million dollars31.Described in research as a "cold peace"2130. Trade: 637.6 million dollars31.Trade with the UAE: 3.209 billion dollars. 1,119,786 passengers from Israel to Dubai, and about 700 visitors from the UAE to Israel31.
Durability since October 2023The treaty is in force. According to reports from 2025 and January 2026 there is no Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv, and Egypt is holding back the Israeli ambassador's accreditation3233.The treaty is in force. Jordan recalled its ambassador in November 2023, and neither side has an ambassador in place3435.No state has left4. Bahrain's ambassadorial post has been empty since April 202536; the UAE called annexation a red line37. In 2026 Israel deployed Iron Dome in the UAE38, and Morocco agreed to upgrade to embassies39.

Why peace with a neighbour you fought is harder

When neighbouring states have fought each other, the agreement has to undo the results of the war. It has to decide who holds which land, where the border runs, how many forces may be stationed near it and who monitors that. For Egypt this meant withdrawal from all of Sinai and the evacuation of settlements710. For Jordan it meant delimiting a border and sharing water62.

On top of that come the memory of war and the cost at home. A public that lost sons in war finds a concession harder to accept, and a leader who signs takes a personal and political risk. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League16, and 23 deputies in Jordan's parliament voted against the treaty18.

In normalization between distant states most of these questions do not exist. There is no land to return and no border to draw, which is why it was possible to go from a first statement to a signing in about a month1512. Each kind delivers something different. A peace treaty with a neighbour removes the threat of war on the border, even when relations between the peoples stay cold. Normalization quickly opens trade, flights and cooperation31, but it does not settle a dispute over land, because no such dispute stood between the parties.

What they all have in common

In every case a decision by leaders was needed, and in every case there was a mediator: an American president signed as witness to the treaty with Egypt, the treaty with Jordan and the treaty with the UAE1212. And in every case each side received something concrete. Egypt received Sinai and Israel received peace1. Jordan received an agreed border and water2. The UAE received the suspension of annexation and Israel received full relations15.

And in every case the signing was only a beginning. What decides whether an agreement lasts is what happens afterwards: the treaties with Egypt and Jordan have survived decades and severe crises, but political relations are at a low point4034. The Abraham Accords survived the war in Gaza, but public support for them in Morocco collapsed421.

What this can teach about a future Israeli–Palestinian agreement

It is the hardest kind
An Israeli–Palestinian agreement would have to settle land, borders, security, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and mutual recognition all at once. In the treaty with Egypt only some of these were on the table, and in the Abraham Accords almost none.
The hard issues were put off again and again
Oslo I deferred Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security and borders to permanent-status negotiations41. That is part of the explanation for why no permanent agreement has been reached to this day.
Answers have already been drafted
The Clinton Parameters of December 2000 proposed an outline for all these issues together. No agreement was signed42.
There is no old border to go back to
With Egypt and Jordan the treaties rested on an international boundary line from the Mandate period16. Between Israel and the Palestinians there is no such agreed line, and the border itself is part of the negotiation.
The cost at home is likely to be high
Even in the easier agreements leaders paid a price1618. An agreement that touches every core issue is likely to stir sharper opposition on both sides. This is an observation, not a prediction.

Sources

  1. Primary Avalon Project, Yale Law School · 26 March 1979
    Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, March 26, 1979
  2. Primary United Nations (UNISPAL) · 26 October 1994
    Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26 October 1994
  3. Research The Washington Institute for Near East Policy · 16 September 2020
    How the Abraham Accords Look Forward, Not Back (David Makovsky)
  4. Research Middle East Institute · 20 April 2026
    The Abraham Accords (backgrounder)
  5. Primary United Nations (UNISPAL) · 25 July 1994
    The Washington Declaration: Israel – Jordan – The United States, 25 July 1994
  6. Primary Avalon Project, Yale Law School · 26 October 1994
    Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan – Annex I (boundary; Naharayim/Baqura and Zofar/Al-Ghamr areas)
  7. Official archive Multinational Force and Observers
    Deadline Met: Mission Begins
  8. Press The Christian Science Monitor · 16 March 1989
    Report on the handover of Taba to Egypt, 16 March 1989
  9. Press The Times of Israel · 10 November 2019
    Liveblog, 10 November 2019
  10. Reference Jewish Virtual Library
    The Yamit Evacuation
  11. Official archive Multinational Force and Observers
    MFO – Origins
  12. Primary The White House (Trump administration archive) · 15 September 2020
    Abraham Accords Peace Agreement: Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel
  13. Primary The White House (Trump administration archive) · 15 September 2020
    Abraham Accords: Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations (Bahrain–Israel)
  14. Primary United Nations (UNISPAL) · 17 September 1978
    Camp David Accords: A Framework for Peace in the Middle East; Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel
  15. Primary The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara · 13 August 2020
    Joint Statement by President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi on the Full Normalization of Relations Between Israel and the United Arab Emirates
  16. Press CNN (via KTVZ) · 7 March 2024
    Arab League Fast Facts
  17. Research James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
    Al-Jihad al-Islami (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) – profile
  18. Research Institute for Palestine Studies – Chronology · 6 November 1994
    Chronology entry, 6 November 1994: Jordanian parliament ratifies the peace treaty
  19. Press Al Jazeera · 14 August 2020
    Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal
  20. Press Al Jazeera · 13 September 2020
    Bahrain opposition rejects Israel normalisation
  21. Research Arab Barometer · 9 January 2025
    MENA Publics and the Future of Normalization with Israel (Michael Robbins)
  22. Official archive Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (via Jewish Virtual Library) · March 1979
    Prime Minister Begin: Summary of Debate on Treaty with Egypt, March 1979
  23. Official archive Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (via Jewish Virtual Library) · 25 October 1994
    Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin on the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, 25 October 1994
  24. Press The Times of Israel · 15 October 2020
    Knesset approves UAE normalization 80-13; mainly Arab party is sole opposition
  25. Press The Times of Israel · 10 November 2020
    With large majority, Knesset approves normalization agreement with Bahrain
  26. Research Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport.com) · 3 March 2015
    Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations (RL33003, Jeremy M. Sharp)
  27. Press PBS NewsHour / Associated Press · 14 December 2021
    U.A.E. will 'suspend discussions' on $23 billion weapons deal with U.S.
  28. Press Al Jazeera · 24 November 2021
    Morocco, Israel sign first-ever defence agreement in Rabat
  29. Press Al Jazeera · 6 January 2021
    Sudan signs deal to normalise relations with Israel
  30. Research Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) · 12 September 2021
    The Old Peace Treaties vs. the Abraham Accords (Frank Musmar and Najat Al-Saied), Perspectives Paper no. 2,151
  31. Research The Heritage Foundation · 2026
    The Abraham Accords: 2025 Annual Report (relaying Israel Central Bureau of Statistics trade data)
  32. Press Ynetnews · 11 May 2025
    Report on Egypt withholding accreditation of Israel's ambassador-designate
  33. Press The Jewish Chronicle · 7 January 2026
    Egypt is revising its peace agreement with Israel (analysis)
  34. Press Ynetnews · 7 July 2026
    Report on Israel–Jordan diplomatic relations and the ambassadors' posts, 7 July 2026
  35. Press Middle East Eye · 8 July 2026
    'No obligation to provide': Israel withholds water from Jordan
  36. Press The Media Line · 9 April 2025
    Bahrain Leaves Ambassador Post in Israel Vacant After Reassignment
  37. Press The National · 3 September 2025
    UAE warns Israeli annexation of West Bank undermines vision of Abraham Accords
  38. Press Associated Press (via WRVO / NPR) · 12 May 2026
    U.S. ambassador to Israel says Israel sent Iron Dome batteries, personnel to UAE
  39. Press Ynetnews · 16 September 2026
    Israel, Morocco agree to upgrade ties, open embassies
  40. Research Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Sada) · 31 August 2026
    Gas and Peace: Can Energy Trade Contain Egypt-Israel Conflict?
  41. Primary PA-X Peace Agreements Database, University of Edinburgh · 13 September 1993
    Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ('Oslo Accords')
  42. Research Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)
    Clinton Parameters (2000)