The Camp David Summit, 2000

The challenge

Oslo promised a permanent deal within five years. May 1999 came and went without one, so the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum set a new target: a framework agreement within five months and a full agreement within a year.¹

Both leaders arrived under pressure. According to the Chatham House researchers, Barak wanted one decisive summit while his coalition was falling apart. Arafat came on the defensive, feared a trap and thought the summit premature.²

The road there

1. 4 September 1999The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum sets target dates for a permanent agreement.¹
2. 11 July 2000The summit opens at Camp David.³
3. 25 July 2000The summit ends without an agreement, with a trilateral statement.³
4. 28 September 2000After a visit by Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif, violent clashes break out.⁴
5. 23 December 2000Clinton presents his parameters to the two sides.⁵

The people

Led

Ehud Barak · Yasser Arafat

Negotiated

Ehud Barak · Yasser Arafat

Mediated

Bill Clinton

Hosted

Bill Clinton

What was discussed

• Everything was on the table: borders, Jerusalem, refugees, security. According to the US Office of the Historian, the gaps remained on borders, Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees.⁴
• Nothing was handed over in writing. According to Robert Malley, who was on the US team, and Hussein Agha, the ideas were put orally, sometimes as American ideas, and stayed conditional.⁶
• The numbers come from testimony. A PLO document of 2001 speaks of Israel annexing about 9% of the West Bank for about 1% of its own land, plus about 10% more on a long lease.⁷⁸ Malley and Agha describe the American ideas in similar figures.⁶ Barak's account is below, under the disputes.
• In the closing statement both sides promised to keep negotiating on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338, and to avoid unilateral steps and violence.³

Read the document

The geography

The hard decisions

• Jerusalem and the refugees touched the rawest nerve of both peoples.²
• Each leader feared his home front. Barak's coalition was collapsing. Arafat feared that fierce opposition to a deal on Jerusalem and refugees would force him to crush an uprising by Hamas.²

Where accounts differ

According to Ehud Barak

Arafat turned down far-reaching proposals and made no counter-offer. According to Benny Morris, who interviewed him, the proposal included a state on about 92% of the West Bank and all of Gaza, a capital in East Jerusalem, and sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. In Barak's view Arafat did not intend to reach a deal, and the intifada was planned in advance.⁹

According to The Palestinian negotiators (PLO document, July 2001)

The offer was not generous and could not make a viable state: about 9% annexed for about 1%, four cantons surrounded by Israel, giving up occupied East Jerusalem, and no serious discussion of the refugees. According to the document, the Palestinians offered one-to-one land swaps, and had already made the historic compromise at Oslo by accepting Israel on 78% of historic Palestine.⁷

According to President Clinton and his envoy Dennis Ross

The main responsibility lies with Arafat. According to Malley and Agha, Clinton blamed the Palestinian side in public.⁶ Ross wrote that everyone made tactical mistakes, but that Arafat was passive, rejected ideas again and again and showed no capacity to close a permanent deal.¹⁰

According to Robert Malley, a member of the US team, and Hussein Agha

All three parties made mistakes: there was no formal Israeli offer, Barak held back earlier commitments and settlements grew, the United States was not neutral, and Arafat made no detailed counter-proposals. They write that the Palestinians accepted the annexation of some settlements for land, Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish areas of East Jerusalem, and a mechanism for implementing the right of return.⁶

According to Yossi Beilin, a minister in Barak's government

Barak wanted peace but did not know how to make it, or how to show the other side he meant it. The US team was not properly prepared.¹¹

What changed in real life

• Two months later, on 28 September 2000, violent clashes broke out and grew into the Second Intifada.⁴ Whether, and how far, the summit's outcome contributed is disputed.

What remains open

• What the summit achieved: the leaders themselves negotiated on every core issue, Jerusalem and the refugees included.⁴ According to Malley and Agha, old taboos were broken, and the two sides understood better than ever what ending the conflict would take.⁶
• What came next built on it: in December 2000 Clinton presented his parameters, and in January 2001 the sides met at Taba.⁵ The Chatham House researchers call the parameters a landmark and see further progress at Taba.²
• Lessons, according to the same researchers: there were no clear “red lines”, and no advance backing from Arab leaders.²
• There is no agreed record. Almost every account of “what was offered” rests on the testimony of one participant, and is best read that way.

Photos, videos and quotes

2000Watch here: Clinton, Barak and Arafat at Camp David

Clinton, Barak and Arafat at Camp David

11 July 2000 · clintonlibrary42

The summit was the first attempt to tackle every final-status issue, including Jerusalem, borders and refugees.

2000Watch here: Clinton on the Camp David summit

Clinton on the Camp David summit

25 July 2000 · clintonlibrary42

The summit ended without an agreement, and the debate over why still goes on.