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Israel and Jordan ·

The London Agreement (Peres–Hussein)

An unofficial understanding reached at a secret meeting; Israel's government never adopted it, so it did not become a binding agreement.

In 30 seconds

In April 1987 Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein met secretly in London and agreed on an outline for an international conference leading to direct talks1. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir rejected the understanding, and it was never carried out1.

Where it stands today

The understanding was not adopted and not implemented1. Peace between Israel and Jordan came only in 1994, with the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty.

In one sentence

To open Israeli–Jordanian–Palestinian negotiations under the umbrella of an international conference.

The challenge

Israel and Jordan were formally at war, although their leaders held secret contacts. Jordan wanted an international framework to give the negotiations backing. In Israel, Peres was then foreign minister and Shamir prime minister, and they took different positions on an international conference1.

The road there

  1. Peres and Hussein meet in London and reach the understanding1.
  2. Shamir rejects the understanding, and Israel's government does not adopt it1.
  3. An international conference of the kind envisaged finally meets in Madrid1.

The people

What the understanding contained

  • An international peace conference with Israel, the Arab states and the permanent members of the Security Council1.
  • The basis: Security Council Resolutions 242 and 3381.
  • The conference would lead to direct, bilateral negotiations1.
  • Palestinian issues would be discussed with a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation1.

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The geography

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Schematic map of Israel and its neighbours with line typesISRAELJORDANWest BankGolan HeightsJerusalemTel AvivGazaRamallahAmmanEilat · Aqaba · TabaNaharayim / Baqura

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Layers · Legend
  • International boundary agreed in a peace treaty
  • Treaty line with Jordan, “without prejudice to the status” of the territory beyond it
  • 1949 armistice line (“Green Line”) — not an agreed final border
  • “Blue Line” — UN line of withdrawal (2000), not a border
  • Ceasefire / disengagement line with Syria (1974)
  • Other international boundary
  • West Bank and Gaza Strip: permanent status not agreed
  • Golan Heights: held by Israel since 1967; annexation not recognised by the UN
  • UN area of separation (UNDOF)

Classification follows the original research as of 7 Oct 2026. This schematic map is not a legal boundary map or a live update.

  • International boundary agreed in a peace treaty
  • Treaty line with Jordan, “without prejudice to the status” of the territory beyond it
  • 1949 armistice line (“Green Line”) — not an agreed final border
  • “Blue Line” — UN line of withdrawal (2000), not a border
  • Ceasefire / disengagement line with Syria (1974)
  • Other international boundary
  • West Bank and Gaza Strip: permanent status not agreed
  • Golan Heights: held by Israel since 1967; annexation not recognised by the UN
  • UN area of separation (UNDOF)

Schematic map. Lines are approximate and are not a legal determination. Data: Natural Earth (public domain), 1:10m scale; line classification and place names by this site. Lines as of October 2026. Peace map

The hard decisions

  • Peres went to the meeting with the prime minister's authorisation, but Shamir rejected what was agreed there1. King Hussein was left with an understanding that the Israeli side did not stand behind.

What was carried out

—

What was not

  • The conference was not convened and the planned negotiations did not open1.

What remains open

  • The episode shows that an understanding between leaders is not enough without political backing at home.

Sources

  1. Research Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)
    Peres-Hussein London Agreement (1987)

Further reading