12 and 15 September 1978 · About 3 minutes
Before the ending: two documents from Camp David
Read before jumping to the signing photograph. What could someone inside the room know while the outcome was still uncertain?
Choices stay on this page. No score, saved answers or submissions.
Context
Sources for this context
- FRUS 1977–1980, vol. IX, document 28: Draft Summary of Meetings Chronology for 5 September 1978, including the two arrival entries.
- FRUS 1977–1980, Volume IX, Second Revised Edition, Document 45: Memorandum of Conversation Opening paragraphs; paragraphs beginning 'He said it was totally impossible' and 'I urged Dayan'; source note 1. Printed pages 176–179.
- FRUS 1977–1980, Volume IX, Second Revised Edition, Document 51: Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin Entire short letter, followed by editorial source note 1.
- FRUS 1977–1980, vol. VIII, document 152: Editorial Note Opening paragraph.
- FRUS 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, document 226: Egyptian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement Articles I, IV and VIII; footnote 2.
Evidence
12 September: the ambassador's report
In our words, not a quotation
Ambassador Samuel Lewis reported that Moshe Dayan saw little prospect of continuing and spoke of plans to leave the next day. Lewis urged them to stay for another draft.
Dayan seemed convinced that there was little left now to do but close out the conference.
Who describes the pessimism: Dayan writing, or someone who spoke with him?
Open the source: FRUS 1977–1980, Volume IX, Second Revised Edition, Document 45: Memorandum of ConversationU.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian · 1978-09-12
15 September: the mediator's letter
In our words, not a quotation
Carter proposed a working sequence to Begin and Sadat: recommendations on Friday, drafting on Saturday, and a Sunday conclusion with a joint press statement.
that tomorrow (Saturday) be devoted to drafting efforts
Does the letter set out the compromise itself, or a way to keep working?
Open the source: FRUS 1977–1980, Volume IX, Second Revised Edition, Document 51: Letter From President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister BeginU.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian · 1978-09-15
Your answer
All choices and explanations
- Fear of failure was recorded; a working sequence was later proposed to conclude the talks.
- Yes. We can trace an assessment and a practical proposal. Explaining why agreement followed requires more evidence.
- By 12 September everyone knew the agreement would be signed.
- The report about Dayan does not support that. It also cannot tell us what every participant thought.
- Carter's letter proves that he alone saved the summit.
- The letter records a proposal. Explaining the breakthrough requires other participants' decisions and responses too.
What next
A question to take away: What would you look for in the next document to tell whether something substantive changed?
List the Sinai provisions separately from the proposed West Bank–Gaza arrangements.
More ways to explore
Content was checked against the linked sources. Translations used AI assistance; a classroom pilot and human Arabic/English language-editor review have not yet taken place.